{"id":6233,"date":"2025-10-26T14:07:20","date_gmt":"2025-10-26T18:07:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.respectmyplanet.org\/publications\/?p=6233"},"modified":"2026-01-18T13:24:55","modified_gmt":"2026-01-18T18:24:55","slug":"michael-barnard-exposing-anti-hydrogen-media-bias-part-3-of-3-critical-minerals-chinas-coal-economy-fair-trade","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.respectmyplanet.org\/publications\/fuel-cells\/michael-barnard-exposing-anti-hydrogen-media-bias-part-3-of-3-critical-minerals-chinas-coal-economy-fair-trade","title":{"rendered":"Michael Barnard: Exposing Anti-Hydrogen Media Bias \u2013 Part 3 of 3- Critical Minerals, China\u2019s Coal Economy, & Fair Trade"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This is Part 3 of a three-part series titled: \u201cMichael Barnard: Exposing Anti-Hydrogen Media Bias \u2013 Part 3 of 3- Critical Minerals, China\u2019s Coal Economy, & Fair Trade\u201d In Part 1<\/a>, the topic and thesis statement for the series were presented, along with Barnard\u2019s curriculum vitae and journalistic modus operandi.  We also explored how Barnard fits into the genesis of the anti-hydrogen media narratives that began in October 2013. In “Part 2 of 3 – Heavy Ground Transportation: Rail, Bus, and Truck<\/a>\u201d, we examined how Barnard misleads readers into viewing batteries and hydrogen as mutually exclusive technologies rather than complementary ones. In this section, we explore the foundation of the new energy economy and China\u2019s near-total monopoly on raw mineral production and metal refining, which underpins the battery, magnet, solar PV, silicon microchip, and electric motor industries. Each part of this series stands alone, but the report was originally written as one long chronological piece and was later divided into three parts to make reading easier.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Critical Minerals, Environmental Threats from the Battery Supply Chain, and Intellectual Property<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

As the clean energy transition accelerates, the conversation can no longer be confined to vehicles, fuels, or even infrastructure. Beneath all of these technologies lies a deeper strategic question: who controls the critical minerals and intellectual property needed to build them at scale? Materials such as lithium, nickel, iron, phosphorus, manganese, cobalt, copper, polysilicon, cathode precursors, graphite for anodes, and rare earth elements are the lifeblood of batteries, motors, and clean energy systems. Control over their production and processing will shape not only industrial competitiveness but also national security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At RMP, we\u2019ve spent years digging into both traditional and emerging energy systems because understanding infrastructure is just as important as advocating for technology. A significant portion of our work has focused on hydrogen infrastructure\u2014mapping its production pathways, distribution infrastructure, and real-world applications. Over the years, RMP has built and maintained multiple interactive energy infrastructure maps: a North American GIS hydrogen map<\/a> that has been live for more than a decade, a global LNG terminal map<\/a> covering every liquefaction & regasification terminal in the world which has been live for just over 10 years, and a NAATBatt-based map of all North American lithium-ion battery infrastructure<\/a> that also layers in copper mines and lithium mining prospects; it’s RMP’s newest GIS map which was just released earlier this year.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Our new lithium-ion battery infrastructure map is perhaps our coolest map yet for diving deep into America\u2019s and Canada\u2019s pursuit of making batteries domestically. Each map is paired with supplemental tables to make the data more accessible and useful for powerful SQL queries. This kind of work reflects what authentic curiosity about energy infrastructure looks like: digging in, cataloging, and sharing the evidence so others can understand the foundations of the transition. If we\u2019re going to champion new energy pathways, we need to know how they work beneath the surface. Readers who care about the future of energy should want the same: a clear view of the machinery behind the headlines.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

By that same logic, it would make sense to expect someone like Michael Barnard\u2014who has written more than a thousand posts attacking hydrogen and praising batteries, solar, and wind\u2014to show a similar curiosity about how batteries, solar panels, and wind turbines are made, where the raw materials come from, and how those materials are refined into cathode- and anode-active components, polysilicon, and electric motors. Spoiler alert: he doesn\u2019t. Barnard\u2019s work always follows his simple narrative: hydrogen bad, Tesla products good, West bad, China good.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Barnard has not shown interest in the complex economic realities of the battery supply chain until recently because it hasn\u2019t served his storyline until recently. If his energy motivations were more authentic, you would think he\u2019d be rolling up his sleeves to dig into how batteries are sourced, processed, and scaled. Barnard downplays China\u2019s dominance when there are concerns about critical minerals and encourages U.S. dependence on its biggest geopolitical rival out of the other side of his mouth.  When this casual dismissiveness of how strategically important critical minerals are to make in the USA and Canada, his articles stop being just sloppy hit pieces\u2014they become dangerous advocacy for poor US and Canadian policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Barnard\u2019s Thin Record on Critical Minerals<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Barnard has written over 1,140 posts for Cleantechnica from February 2014 through October 2025, but less than 10 (less than 0.9%) have ‘critical minerals’ as a keyword in his titled works. His first post about critical minerals came in 2021 with a short piece on lithium that in essence says Canada has an abundance of lithium but Canada should just leave it in the ground and buy from China.[28]<\/a><\/sup> Barnard did not touch the critical minerals subject again until three years later in 2024.  His 2024 article was another of his trademark attacks, this time aimed at the Geological Survey of Finland\u2019s Associate Professor Simon Michaux, dismissing serious research from a nationally recognized institution that conflicted with his narrative.[29]<\/a><\/sup> It wasn\u2019t until December 2024 that Barnard interviewed (in my opinion) one of his more interesting and educated guests Gavin Mudd, the director of the Critical Minerals Intelligence Center at the British Geological Survey. That conversation with Mudd became podcast episodes 043<\/a> and 044<\/a> in early 2025.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a>
In this image, Barnard asked ChatGPT to generate \u201ca panoramic split image contrasting China\u2019s vast solar farms and HVDC lines with the U.S.\u2019s coal power plant, flags marking two divergent energy paths.\u201d This is despite China burning over half of the world\u2019s coal \u2014 about 92 exajoules annually \u2014 more than all other countries combined. China continues to add new coal capacity each month even as it expands renewables, while much of the coal burned elsewhere in Asia supports Chinese industrial supply chains. The image, though visually striking, omits the full context of China\u2019s ongoing reliance on coal.<\/em> (source<\/a>)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n

Mudd did not seem to be a regular in Barnard\u2019s circle of friendly voices.  Mudd forced Barnard out of his comfort zone as compared to way he behaves with more friendly guests like Paul Martin, Michael Raynor, or David Cebon who are Barnard\u2019s anti-hydrogen drinking buddies.[30-1]<\/a><\/sup> At several points, Mudd\u2019s expertise collided directly with Barnard\u2019s narrative, leaving Barnard to pivot or sidestep. The exchange highlighted both Mudd\u2019s command of the subject and Barnard\u2019s lack of depth on critical minerals.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Early in the discussion, Barnard seemed to demonstrate he hasn\u2019t put much thought into the battery supply chain or rare earths. Around the 12-minute mark, he tentatively asked Mudd: \u201cProbably the two primary battery metals that get discussed\u2026 cobalt and lithium, is from my perspective\u2026 Is that accurate?, or is there any other critical mineral you\u2019re concerned about at the Critical Minerals Intelligence Center?\u201d Mudd\u2019s answer was a cautious \u201cNo\u201d.[31-1]<\/a><\/sup>  I got the feeling Mudd was realizing, just like I was at that moment, that critical minerals were not a familiar topic to Barnard.  Mudd explained that most of metals designated by the US as critical are the same ones the UK has designated critical to give Barnard a primer.  The way Barnard posed the question\u2014tentative and narrowly framed\u2014shows that after ten years of promoting battery propulsion he has not put much effort into understanding the raw materials, refined materials, and manufacturing processes required to make them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Barnard seemed to only be superficially aware of minerals with controversial social media hot takes like lithium and cobalt.  Later, when Mudd discussed the economics of recycling NMC versus LFP cathodes and why there is motivation to recycle one of those cathodes and zero interest in the other, Barnard didn\u2019t engage because he didn\u2019t know enough to engage. Mudd was referencing what we talk about at RMP in that nickel & cobalt have a value proposition for recycling, but iron and phosphate are cheap and there will be less motivation to recycle LFP batteries. Mudd explains “I think one of the problems we’re seeing with the rise of LFP batteries is that they’re all cheap materials largely. So things like cobalt, it’s an expensive metal, nickel is an expensive metal. That means the price of that battery or the value of that battery was certainly much higher”[32-1]<\/a><\/sup> Barnard wouldn’t bite on the topic and would pivot back to a topic where he was comfortable, like something pro-China or anti-hydrogen. He showed no interest in the recycling value proposition concept.  Rather than examining how and where various cathode chemistries are manufactured, Barnard\u2019s narrative centers on the role batteries play in lowering CO\u2082 emissions in Western countries after they arrive from China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Again and again, Barnard tried to pivot back to familiar talking points when he was out of his depth with Mudd. At one point he again shifted to praising the Tesla Semi, a truck still not in series production today in late 2025 that Tesla took deposits for in 2017.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At another point in the critical mineral\u2019s conversation with Mudd, Barnard downplays projected copper shortages by suggesting aluminum substitution will change global copper projections. It will not. Barnard downplays copper projections because the facts on copper shortfalls complicate his optimistic narrative that electrification is advancing quickly and resource shortages are nothing his followers should worry about. Barnard claims that he thinks aluminum will step up and reduce the amount of copper necessary for electrification. By Barnard suggesting copper demand will not need to roughly double by 2035 is misleading spin that distracts from important conversations about the difficulty related to boosting copper supplies. Copper demand is projected to double by 2035, regardless of Barnard’s opinions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Barnard\u2019s suggestion that aluminum use in high-voltage transmission will significantly blunt copper demand is a good example of his broader playbook. It is true that aluminum dominates in overhead transmission lines because it is lighter and cheaper than copper, and this fact is worth noting. But that does not translate to copper demand disappearing across the wider electrification system. Distribution networks, underground cabling, motors, transformers, and EV components overwhelmingly rely on copper because conductivity, durability, and efficiency matter more than material cost & weight in those contexts. Institutions such as the IEA and S&P Global continue to project sharp increases in copper demand as electrification accelerates, despite aluminum\u2019s clear role in transmission. By elevating one correct but narrow fact and using it to dismiss larger, well-documented projections, Barnard deflects attention from the full picture and attacks and discredits experts. This copper example is not an outlier but another microcosm of his modus operandi: select a narrow truth, stretch it into a general conclusion, and use it to undermine expert analysis that complicates his narrative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where institutions and analysts see structural constraints on copper, Barnard insists they are wrong, leaning on contrarian narrative rather than evidence. Just like Barnard is wrong about the need for more hydrogen to displace diesel, he\u2019s wrong about copper required for his thesis of \u2018electrifying everything\u2019. According to S&P Global\u2019s commodity outlook, global copper demand is projected to double\u2014rising from around 25 million metric tons per year today to roughly 50 million tpy by 2035\u2014driven directly by the energy transition and the massive requirements of electrification and renewable energy technologies.[33]<\/a><\/sup> Similarly, Willis Towers Watson forecasts copper consumption nearly doubling to about 50 million tpy by 2035, again attributed to the accelerating global shift toward clean energy systems,[34]<\/a><\/sup> The point of my article you\u2019re reading now is that you should trust and support our credible institutions that Barnard attacks and not Barnard\u2019s attack pieces on any institution that does not follow his narrative.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Later in the Mudd podcast, Barnard took time to make ad hominem attacks on another research institution named ARENA\u2014the Australian Renewable Energy Agency\u2014Barnard says \u201cARENA the Australian Renewable Energy and National Something Organic [sic] Association, they’re a big investment fund for mostly clean tech. They’ve got some bad stuff and some stupid stuff they say about hydrogen\u201d.[32-2]<\/a><\/sup> As pointed out repeatedly through this article, it is standard practice for Barnard to attack research institutions when their publications conflict with his anti-hydrogen narrative; in this case hydrogen was not even on topic. Mudd, however, stayed on point, grounding the conversation in data. Barnard had the chance to explore meaningful issues with Mudd, such as the economic trade-offs between different cathode chemistries, but the opportunity was lost. His lack of knowledge left him unable to engage on the topic of critical minerals and keep falling back to narrative topics like Tesla and anti-hydrogen smear.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mudd also raised serious environmental topics related to Barnard\u2019s clean energy thesis that Barnard consistently separates from batteries, such as the Mount Polley tailings disaster in British Columbia and the Brumadinho disaster in Brazil. These events were not caused by battery-metal mining per se, but they serve as stark reminders of what happens when large-scale mining operations fail. The processes used to extract and refine copper, nickel, and other minerals required for batteries are the very same types of mining that produce toxic tailings, massive waste plumes, and long-term water contamination. The risks are not hypothetical\u2014they are inherent to the industry. Mudd even says about the industry he studies every day for his job: \u201cHistorically the mining industry is considered a dirty industry and the industry would not disagree with that.\u201d[31-2]<\/a><\/sup> Making batteries carries serious threats to freshwater resources and the air we breathe at every step in the supply chain, unlike renewable hydrogen that literally produces pure potable water as a byproduct.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\n The Thacker Pass project, designed to be an environmentally advanced lithium mine with minimized water and carbon intensity, highlights the central conflict of the green energy transition: the necessity of extracting critical minerals for battery electric vehicles (BEVs) is opposed by environmental and Indigenous groups who prioritize the protection of local ecosystems and cultural sites from mining’s inherent impacts. This video from Lithium Americas explains the design of their state-of-the-art mine, which you can read more about on the Thacker Pass Overview page<\/a>.\n<\/p>\n\n